Islamabad Talks lay groundwork for future Peace talks

By Elnur Enveroglu

In moments of international crisis, diplomacy often turns not to the loudest powers, but to the states that can still speak to everyone. That is why Pakistan’s emergence as a host and facilitator in talks between the United States and Iran deserves closer attention.

Islamabad may not command the economic weight of Washington, Beijing or Brussels, but it possesses something equally valuable in a fractured region: access, credibility and strategic necessity.

The first round of talks between the US and Iran, reportedly supported through Pakistani channels, was significant less for any breakthrough than for the fact that it happened at all. In today’s Middle East, where mistrust runs deeper than pipelines and old grievances harden into doctrine, getting adversaries into the same diplomatic process is itself an achievement. Pakistan helped create that opening.

This should not be surprising. Pakistan occupies a unique geopolitical position. It is a Muslim-majority nuclear power with deep historical links across the Gulf, longstanding ties with Washington, a working border relationship with Iran, and close defence partnerships with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. Few countries can maintain functional relations with all sides simultaneously. Fewer still can do so while carrying weight in the wider Islamic world.

Its nuclear status matters here. Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority state with an acknowledged nuclear deterrent. That gives it symbolic authority as well as strategic relevance. In a region where power is often measured in military terms, Islamabad is not easily dismissed. It understands deterrence, escalation and the dangers of miscalculation better than many commentators assume.

Pakistan’s history also shows that it is no stranger to crisis management. It has navigated multiple wars and stand-offs in South Asia, including conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971, the Kargil confrontation of 1999, and repeated border escalations since. It has lived through sanctions, proxy wars and the long aftershocks of the Afghan conflict. This does not make Pakistan flawless. But it does make it experienced in the hard realities of regional security politics.

That experience is useful in a Gulf crisis that risks spiralling beyond the Gulf itself. Pakistan knows that wars rarely stay confined to their original geography. A clash between the US and Iran would send oil prices soaring, unsettle shipping lanes, radicalise politics and disrupt trade routes from the Arabian Sea to Central Asia. Islamabad has every reason to seek de-escalation.

There is also an economic logic to Pakistan’s diplomacy. The country sits at the junction of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Through the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, and via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamabad sees itself as a connector state rather than a frontline state. Therefore, stability in the Gulf is essential for that vision. Trade corridors cannot flourish under missile alerts, and investors do not queue for markets overshadowed by war.

That helps explain why Pakistan wants peace not as an abstract moral principle, but as a practical national interest. Millions of Pakistanis work in Gulf economies. Energy imports remain vital. Remittance flows are crucial. Any prolonged confrontation between Washington and Tehran would hit Pakistan’s economy directly.

The second round of talks between the US and Iran may yet disappoint. Such negotiations are rarely linear. They advance, stall and retreat. Public statements are often designed for domestic audiences rather than diplomatic progress. Washington will continue to demand constraints on Iran’s strategic capabilities; Tehran will continue to insist on sovereignty and sanctions relief. No mediator can erase those contradictions.

However, even if the next round yields no grand bargain, Pakistan still stands to gain diplomatically. Trust in mediation is built not only through successful agreements, but through reliability, discretion and the ability to keep channels open when others cannot. If both sides are willing to meet again under Pakistan’s watch, that is already a vote of confidence in Islamabad’s neutrality and competence.

Pakistan’s broader regional relationships strengthen this image. Its close ties with Azerbaijan, for example, illustrate a growing network of strategic partnerships beyond South Asia. Islamabad and Baku describe each other in terms of brotherhood, and not merely rhetorically. They cooperate on defence, trade, transport and political support in international forums. For Azerbaijan, Pakistan is a dependable partner in the Muslim world. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan is a gateway to the Caucasus and Caspian region. These ties reinforce Islamabad’s profile as a state capable of linking regions rather than dividing them.

There is a lesson here for larger powers. Middle-order states are often underestimated until a crisis reveals their value. Pakistan cannot impose peace on the US and Iran. It cannot substitute for political will in Washington or Tehran. But it can provide a table, a channel and a measure of trust where trust is scarce.

That alone makes Islamabad more important than many had assumed. In a world of grandstanding powers and shrinking diplomatic space, Pakistan’s quiet usefulness may prove one of the more consequential stories of this crisis.

This article was originally published by Azernews