Russian President Putin’s Dec 4-5 visit to Delhi set to reboot 70 year old relationship

Renovated energy deals, Defence contracts as also labour mobility top the agenda

By T N Ashok

How a seemingly routine bilateral summit could reset global energy flows, defence alignments, and Asia’s security geometrics.

When Vladimir Putin steps onto the tarmac in New Delhi on December 4 , it will not be merely another ceremonial handshake between two leaders who have perfected the choreography of personal bonhomie. It may, in fact, be the most geopolitically consequential bilateral visit India hosts this decade — a visit that tests the resilience of a 70-year strategic partnership while rattling capitals across Washington, Brussels, Riyadh, Beijing, Tokyo and every major ASEAN chancery.

For Moscow, strangled by Western sanctions and dependent on Asian markets for survival, the visit is not optional. For New Delhi, it is equally vital — not for nostalgia but because the India-Russia relationship, long dismissed as a Cold War relic, has mutated into something unexpected: a hard-headed, interest-based alignment that the West cannot easily constrain and China cannot easily exploit.

To understand why the world is watching nervously, one must first peel away the ceremonial veneer and examine what is actually on the table: defence pacts that circumvent Western technology controls; energy deals at prices that could redefine global oil markets; currency arrangements that bypass the dollar; and security cooperation that signals India will not be cajoled into a Western-centric geopolitical architecture.

This is not an alliance. It is something more dangerous for Western planners: a flexible, resilient partnership between two large powers that refuse to be contained.

India’s relationship with Moscow is old enough to have outlived wars, ideologies, presidents and prime ministers. It began tentatively with Jawaharlal Nehru’s diplomatic outreach in the 1950s, deepened under Lal Bahadur Shastri, and reached its strategic zenith under Indira Gandhi — the architect of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.

It was in that extraordinary winter of 1971 that Moscow earned its permanent seat in India’s strategic consciousness. As the USS Enterprise of the U.S. Seventh Fleet steamed into the Bay of Bengal in a bid to intimidate India during the Bangladesh liberation war, the Soviet Pacific Fleet moved in response, sending an unmistakable signal to Washington: India would not be coerced.

Rajiv Gandhi expanded defence cooperation and technological ties; V.P. Singh preserved continuity; Atal Bihari Vajpayee modernised it; and Narendra Modi — despite his close ties with Washington — has given the partnership a new, transactional, realpolitik grounding.

The throughline is unmistakable: when the chips are down, Moscow has never abandoned India. That memory now returns with strategic force, because both countries find themselves confronting Western pressure — albeit for different reasons.

For Putin, the Delhi visit is no longer a diplomatic routine. It is a lifeline. After three years of sanctions, export bans, price caps and financial isolation, Russia’s economic survival depends increasingly on a handful of large partners: China, India, Türkiye and the Gulf. China’s dominance over the Russian economy has become uncomfortably asymmetric for Moscow. Türkiye is opportunistic. The Gulf is transactional. Only India offers scale without subordination, market access without political conditions, and a diplomatic platform without ideological entanglement.

Russia’s strategic calculus is straightforward: India is now Russia’s second-largest oil buyer after China, often purchasing at discounts that irritate Washington but keep Moscow solvent. Rupee-rouble settlements, still clunky, offer an alternative to the weaponised dollar. Without India, half of Russia’s defence-industrial base would collapse. A warm Delhi–Moscow axis prevents China from monopolising influence over Russia. Putin needs India to rebalance his Asia strategy — and to announce to the West that Russia will not be diplomatically isolated.

India’s logic is more complex, more calculating. Russia remains India’s most trusted defence supplier, not because Moscow is perfect, but because the alternatives come with political strings and unpredictable pricing.

More than 60–70% of India’s military hardware still carries Russian DNA — from Su-30 MKI fighters to T-90 tanks, Kilo-class submarines and the much-debated S-400 air defence system. Spare parts, maintenance pipelines, and joint platforms such as BrahMos anchor the two militaries together in ways Western analysts often underestimate.

Then there is energy. Russian oil has helped India tame inflation, stabilise energy costs, and diversify away from volatile Middle Eastern markets. Russian crude, often sold at steep discounts, has indirectly strengthened India’s macroeconomic stability — an outcome the West complains about but cannot prevent.

Finally, there is strategy. India’s goal is not to help Russia; it is to prevent China from acquiring uncontested dominance over Moscow. A weakened Russia that becomes an economic colony of Beijing is the worst-case scenario for New Delhi. Thus, maintaining ties with Moscow is not sentiment. It is self-preservation.

While much of the summit will be wrapped in polite communiqués about “strategic cooperation,” the real action lies beneath: a set of defence pacts and technology arrangements that could change Asia’s security balance.

The mothballed Indo-Russian FGFA project — based on Russia’s Su-57 platform — is reportedly back on the table. India had earlier walked away due to concerns about cost and stealth capability, but Moscow is now offering deeper technology transfer, local production, and joint avionics development.

If revived, it would: give India a near-fifth-generation capability years before U.S. export controls loosen, keep Russia’s advanced aerospace industry solvent and create an Indo-Russian counterweight to China’s J-20 programme. The Pentagon will not like this.

India and Russia already co-produce the BrahMos cruise missile — one of the fastest in the world. The next step is a hypersonic BrahMos-II, capable of speeds above Mach 7.

A joint announcement, even a framework, would: give India a strategic first-strike or counter-force capability no Western ally currently shares, extend Russia’s hypersonic reach across the Indo-Pacific without needing bases and trigger unease in Beijing, Islamabad and Canberra simultaneously. Washington views hypersonics as the next major escalation ladder — and India–Russia cooperation here is a direct challenge.

India’s nuclear submarine programme has Russian fingerprints all over it — from reactor design to hull stabilisation systems. Moscow is now offering a new generation of consultancy and possible reactor upgrades, allowing India to accelerate: the Arihant-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet and a future nuclear attack submarine (SSN) programme. This is the kind of support no Western country will provide — not even France. Russia’s oil strategy has already upended global markets. But the Delhi visit may introduce far bigger shocks.

Moscow is proposing a 10–15 year oil supply contract with India at rates pegged to Asian, not Western, benchmarks. If accepted: Moscow locks in stable revenue, India locks in predictable, cheaper oil and the Western “price cap” effectively collapses. Europe will roar, but India will not blink.

India already has a minority stake in Sakhalin-1. Russia now wants Indian refiners and ONGC Videsh to: increase their share, jointly develop Arctic LNG with Rosneft and Novatek and participate in new eastern Siberian oilfields. This shifts India deeper into Russia’s energy architecture — and reduces Western leverage over both countries.

The RBI and Russian central bank are exploring: rupee-rouble mechanisms, a local-currency digital payments backbone and a commodity-backed settlement system for crude and arms. Any functional model would undermine the dollar’s dominance across parts of Asia. Washington will see this as a provocation, even if India publicly downplays it.

The United States will issue careful statements about “respecting India’s strategic autonomy,” while privately its security establishment will be furious.

India’s closer defence cooperation with Russia complicates: CAATSA sanctions diplomacy; U.S.–India technology transfer agreements; Quad military interoperability; and efforts to isolate Moscow in the Indo-Pacific. Washington cannot punish India — it needs Delhi against China — but it will quietly dial up pressure.

Europe desperately wants India to stop buying discounted Russian crude. But India’s purchases have: stabilised global supply; prevented oil price spikes that would have hurt the EU; undermined the price cap; and helped Russia bypass sanctions. Brussels will complain loudly, but do little.

Beijing does not want Russia drifting too close to India. China’s nightmare scenario is: a Russia that plays India and China off against each other to maximise leverage. Putin’s visit signals that exact possibility. Yet China will not openly object — it needs Russia more than Russia needs China.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both partners to India and Russia, will watch nervously. A long-term oil contract between Moscow and Delhi: reduces OPEC influence, fragments global pricing systems, and pushes Asian buyers toward multi-benchmark pricing. The Gulf monarchies will recalibrate but cannot risk alienating India, their fastest-growing energy market.

Pakistan will see an Indo-Russian defence revival as a strategic threat. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar — all recipients of Russian defence equipment — will watch for new procurement opportunities. Vietnam will quietly welcome deeper India–Russia military ties as a counter to China. The region’s security equilibrium will shift — subtly but unmistakably.

Some analysts argue the visit is mostly theatre: red carpets, handshakes, and communiqués about “historic ties.”But this time, optics are the icing — not the cake.

The real story lies in: long-term energy contracts; possible revival of flagship defence projects; nuclear submarine cooperation; currency bypass systems; hypersonic development; a Russia that wants alternatives to China; and an India that refuses Western tutelage. This is not nostalgia. This is geopolitics at its coldest and most transactional.

What emerges from Putin’s visit may determine whether: Russia remains China’s junior partner; India becomes the central pivot between East and West; the dollar’s dominance in energy pricing erodes; Asian defence alliances realign; and the West loses strategic influence over the Global South.

The answer will unfold not in headlines or joint statements, but in the quiet signing of multi-billion-dollar contracts, classified defence annexes, and long-term institutional frameworks.

In an era of weaponised finance, fragmented supply chains, and great-power rivalry, India and Russia are—ironically—rediscovering the logic that first bound them together: strategic autonomy in a world that refuses easy choices. (IPA Service)