Missiles fall, economy strains: How long can Israel brace for prolonged conflict with Iran?

As Washington signals readiness for a sustained campaign, Israel faces the prospect of weeks of missile exchanges with Iran amid mounting military, economic and social pressure. Air defences, public morale, and financial resilience are emerging as critical tests in a widening confrontation.

Air raid sirens have once again become the soundtrack of daily life in Israel. As missiles streak across the sky and families rush to shelters, leaders in both Israel and the United States are signalling that the confrontation with Iran may last not days, but weeks.

In Washington, President Donald Trump has made clear that a prolonged campaign poses no difficulty for the United States, insisting the American military has the depth and resources for an extended fight. For Israel, however, the calculation is more complex. After more than two years of near-constant warfare, including the assault on Gaza, operations in Lebanon and Syria, and an earlier round of hostilities with Iran, the strain is visible across society, the armed forces and the economy.

Since launching strikes on Iran on Saturday, Israel has faced repeated waves of missile and drone attacks. Cities including Haifa and Tel Aviv have been targeted, triggering widespread air raid warnings and forcing schools to close. Tens of thousands of reservists have been mobilised. Emergency services are under pressure, and much of the public has spent days moving between home and bomb shelters.

For now, public backing for the campaign remains strong. Interviews conducted in major cities point to a widespread determination to confront an adversary long portrayed as bent on Israel’s destruction. With the exception of the far left, political parties have rallied behind the government.

That support reflects a broader hardening within Israeli society. Politicians once considered fringe figures on the far right now sit at the heart of government. Deepening political divisions and economic pressure have accelerated the departure of young professionals from the country. Those who remain have grown up viewing Iran as Israel’s central foe, and a drawn-out conflict risks entrenching that outlook further.

For Bar-Tal, it is impossible to predict what kind of society might emerge from weeks of renewed war. What is clear, he argues, is that Israel’s long-held moral certainty about the justice of its founding was not shaken either by the massacres of the 1948 Nakba or by the recent genocide in Gaza.

Beyond the social consequences, military realities loom large. A central question is how long Israel can sustain the current intensity of operations against a state with Iran’s size and capabilities. Much depends on continued backing from allies in the United States and Europe, and on whether Israeli air defences or Iranian missile stocks are depleted first.

Israel relies on three principal air defence systems, Iron Dome, designed to intercept short-range rockets and artillery; David’s Sling, which counters medium-range rockets and cruise missiles; and Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, built to stop ballistic missiles.

The precise number of interceptors in Israel’s arsenal is not public. During the previous 12-day conflict, stocks reportedly ran low, suggesting that a prolonged exchange could force the military to ration its defences. In such a scenario, priority would likely be given to military and political sites, increasing the risk to civilian areas.

According to Israeli and US sources, Iran has been producing ballistic missiles at a rate of roughly 100 per month since June’s earlier confrontation, implying that Tehran has built up a considerable stockpile. Attar cautioned, however, that the scale of the threat depends not only on quantity but also on the types of missiles in Iran’s possession.

The economic burden is also mounting. More than two years of sustained operations have weighed heavily on public finances. Spending on the wars in Lebanon and Gaza reached $31bn in 2024, contributing to the country’s largest budget deficit in years. Early figures for 2025 indicate that war expenditure has climbed to $55bn.

The strain has not gone unnoticed internationally. In 2024, all three major credit rating agencies downgraded Israel’s sovereign credit rating, citing the financial impact of the conflicts.

Yet economic pressure alone is unlikely to dictate the course of the war. As one political economist put it, “This is not a question of economy, but a question of technology.”