Why Nepal Is Objecting To India-China Kailash Mansarovar Yatra Plan

Nepal Foreign Ministry's statement said the government has drawn the attention of both India and China to its concerns through diplomatic channels.

03 May 2026, 16:05 · www.ndtv.com

Show
Quick Read
Summary is AI-generated, newsroom-reviewed

Nepal has objected to India and China's plans to conduct the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through Lipulekh Pass
Nepal's government has made clear it will continue pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels
This is the latest chapter in one of South Asia's most stubborn and emotionally charged territorial disputes

Did our AI summary help?
Let us know.
Switch To Beeps Mode

Nepal's Foreign Ministry has formally objected to India and China's plans to conduct the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through the Lipulekh Pass, asserting that the high-altitude Himalayan crossing sits on Nepali soil and that neither neighbour has the right to use it without Kathmandu's consent. The statement, issued on Sunday in Kathmandu, is the latest chapter in one of South Asia's most stubborn and emotionally charged territorial disputes.

What Prompted The Statement

India's Ministry of External Affairs recently announced that the 2026 Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, a sacred pilgrimage to Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar in Tibet, will be conducted between June and August in coordination with Beijing. A total of 1,000 pilgrims, travelling in batches of 50, will use two routes: one through the Nathu La Pass in Sikkim, and another through Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand. Online registrations have already opened, with a deadline of May 19.

Nepal said it was not consulted or informed. And it is not pleased.

Nepal Foreign Ministry's statement said the government has drawn the attention of both India and China to its concerns through diplomatic channels, reiterated that the Lipulekh region is integral Nepali territory, and urged both countries to refrain from conducting any activities there, whether road construction, border trade, or religious pilgrimage. It also confirmed that even China, described as a "friendly country," has been officially told that Lipulekh belongs to Nepal.

Responding to Kathmandu's statement, India's Ministry of External Affairs told the media that New Delhi's stance on Lipulekh is "consistent and clear." The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has used the Lipulekh Pass as a route since 1954, the spokesperson said, adding, "This is not a new development."

Kathmandu's territorial claims, New Delhi said, are "neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence," and any unilateral enlargement of territorial boundaries is "untenable."

The Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, said India "remains open to constructive interaction with Nepal on all bilateral issues," including on resolving outstanding boundary disputes through diplomatic means.

A Border Drawn In 1816, And Disputed Ever Since

To understand why Nepal reacts so sharply to Lipulekh, one must go back more than two centuries.

The 1816 Treaty of Sugauli ended the Anglo-Nepalese War and redrew the map of the region. Under the treaty, the Kali River, also known as the Mahakali, was established as Nepal's western boundary. Nepal's position, held consistently since the 1990s, is that the river originates at Limpiyadhura, and that all land lying east of that source, including Kalapani and Lipulekh, therefore belongs to Nepal. The three territories together cover a strategically vital stretch of the western Himalayas at the trijunction of Nepal, India, and Tibet.

New Delhi argues that the river's true source lies further east, near the Lipukhola tributary, which would exclude Kalapani and Lipulekh from Nepali territory. Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Indian troops established posts in the Kalapani valley to monitor the Chinese border, and they never left. Over the decades, the area passed from contested to simply administered, with India treating it as its own and Nepal largely holding its tongue.

The Crisis That Brought It All to a Head: Oli In 2020

For years, the dispute simmered. Then, in May 2020, it boiled over.

The trigger was the inauguration of an 80-kilometre road built by India's Border Roads Organisation, connecting Dharchula in Uttarakhand all the way to the Lipulekh Pass. The road was framed by New Delhi as a major infrastructure achievement, one that would ease access for Kailash Mansarovar pilgrims and strengthen strategic connectivity to the Chinese border. For Kathmandu, it was a provocation of the highest order.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's government erupted. Nepal issued formal diplomatic protests, called in the Indian Ambassador, and within days released a new official political map of Nepal, one that explicitly incorporated Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani within its borders. The map was not merely an administrative update. Nepal's Parliament passed it with unanimous support in June 2020, embedding the new boundaries into the nation's legal framework and effectively making the territorial claim a constitutional matter.

The Indian response was swift and dismissive. New Delhi called the map a "unilateral act," rejected Nepal's position as historically unjustified, and insisted its activities were entirely within Indian territory. The diplomatic temperature between the two traditionally close neighbours, often described as sharing a relationship of roti-beti, bread and daughters, plunged to one of its lowest points in decades.

At home, however, Oli rode a wave of nationalist sentiment. The map became a symbol of Nepali pride and sovereignty, and the prime minister, often criticised for his political manoeuvring, was suddenly celebrated as a defender of the nation. It was a rare moment of cross-party unity in Nepal's fractious political landscape.

China's Role: Present But Evasive

What makes this dispute even more complicated is that it involves not two but three countries, and China, despite being the quieter party, has consistently acted in ways that inflame Nepali sensitivities.

In 2015, India and China agreed bilaterally to open Lipulekh as a trade corridor and as the route for the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. Nepal was not at the table for that conversation. The agreement drew immediate protests from Kathmandu, which argued that no bilateral arrangement between India and China could legitimise the use of Nepali territory without Nepal's knowledge or agreement.

In August 2025, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India, the two countries agreed once again to reopen the Lipulekh Pass for border trade. Nepal's reaction was swift. Former Prime Minister KP Oli, attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin shortly after, raised the issue directly with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi's response, by most accounts, was polite but noncommittal. He did not challenge Nepal's claim, but he did not endorse it either, reiterating that the matter was fundamentally between Nepal and India.

Critics at home noted the limits of Oli's approach. Raising the issue with Xi was symbolically important, but it changed nothing on the ground.

The Same Story, A New Year

Now, with the 2026 Yatra announcement, the cycle has repeated itself once more.

The Kathmandu's statement is careful in its language, diplomatic, measured, and committed to peaceful resolution through negotiation. It references historical treaties, maps, and evidence as the proper basis for settling the boundary question. It expresses Nepal's enduring commitment to dialogue rather than confrontation.

But behind the measured words lies a fundamental frustration: that Nepal has been making the same argument, to the same neighbours, for the better part of three decades and very little has changed.

Nepal has no troops at Lipulekh. It has no road to the pass. It has no physical presence in Kalapani. What it has is a constitutional claim, a historical argument rooted in the Sugauli Treaty, a new map that its parliament unanimously endorsed, and a Foreign Ministry that keeps sending notes that largely go unanswered.

What Comes Next

Nepal's government has made clear it will continue pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels. Whether that diplomatic persistence will eventually yield results is another matter entirely. For now, as the summer pilgrimage season approaches and Indian devotees prepare to cross through Lipulekh on their journey to one of Hinduism's most sacred sites, Nepal's objection stands, firm in principle, unresolved in practice, and as complicated as the Himalayas themselves.

Show full article

Track Latest News Live on NDTV.com and get news updates from India and around the world