Commentary: Could Trump really walk away after Ukraine rejects ‘final offer’ peace deal?
A shaky ceasefire with vague commitments to a future peace agreement could be sold as a success, but it would not end the war, says international security expert Stefan Wolff.
by Stefan Wolff · CNA · JoinRead a summary of this article on FAST.
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BIRMINGHAM: Even United States President Donald Trump is finding the reality of negotiations less easy than imagined: Having boasted about ending the war in Ukraine in 24 hours, he now finds himself close to the 100-day mark of his second term oscillating between threatening to walk away from ceasefire negotiations and promising that a deal was “very close”.
The question is whether either is a realistic outcome.
Ministerial-level talks to discuss ending the war fell through on Wednesday (Apr 23) after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio abruptly cancelled his participation, prompting British, French and German counterparts to pull out as well.
For Mr Trump, Ukraine is an important puzzle piece in his reconfiguration of US-Russia relations. These are critical to his focus on China, especially from the perspective of driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing.
This strategy is often referred to as a “reverse Kissinger”, in reference to the late American grand strategist’s success of capitalising on the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and normalising US relations with communist China.
That Mr Trump and his advisers lack the strategic acumen of Henry Kissinger and that there is no Russia-China split on the horizon to capitalise on does not mean that rapprochement between the US and Russia is impossible.
On the contrary, if the terms were right, both Mr Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin might yet seal a deal to serve their interests – but such a deal will unlikely bring an end to the war against Ukraine.
THE ONLY PLAYER WITH A REMOTE CHANCE
The US is still the only player in the complex dynamics of negotiations with even a remote chance of getting a deal done, because of the leverage the Trump administration has over Russia and Ukraine. Past initiatives by other countries never got any traction, because they lacked the ability to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the table.
In Russia’s case, Mr Trump has so far focused on incentives and emphasised that he can offer Mr Putin much of what the Kremlin wants. Washington’s seven-point peace plan, which has not been published, included the recognition of territorial gains in Ukraine, the lifting of all US sanctions and ruling out Ukraine’s future North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership.
The consequential weakening of the transatlantic alliance would also ensure, in the Kremlin’s eyes, a reordering of European security for the benefit of Russia, including US withdrawal from Europe and limits on the size and capabilities of Ukraine’s armed forces.
It is not clear, however, what, if anything, Russia has offered in return – apart from relinquishing claims to territory that Russia does not yet control.
By contrast, the US president has concentrated on pressure on his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Mr Trump has been unequivocal that he will suspend military aid and intelligence sharing as leverage. This has made sure that Ukraine keeps engaged in negotiations and accepts giving the US privileged access to Ukraine’s mineral and energy resources and infrastructure.
The limits of such leverage, however, are clear: Mr Zelenskyy ruled out a recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, proposed in the US peace deal. Mr Trump's response was to lash out on Truth Social, blaming Mr Zelenskyy for prolonging the “killing field”.
COULD TRUMP WALK AWAY FROM PEACE TALKS?
The gap between what the US has put on the table and what Ukraine and its European partners will accept remains wide.
If, in light of these difficulties, he did abandon talks, Mr Trump could still cut a deal with Mr Putin in an effort to pry him away from China. But such a deal – on Russia’s terms – would almost inevitably deal another major blow to the American alliance system in Europe and further increase doubt about the dependability of the US as a partner among its Asian allies.
Both outcomes would be detrimental to US interests in its rivalry with China and are unlikely to be offset by vague hopes of the Kremlin realigning with the White House.
Alternatively, Mr Trump could turn against Mr Putin for failing to agree to a ceasefire and finally implement his earlier threat to impose large-scale sanctions on Russia.
Unlikely as this is at the moment, this would likely preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance, at least for the time being, and allow Mr Trump to conclude his coveted minerals deal with Ukraine. If it also means the continuation of US military support and intelligence sharing, such an outcome would clearly be problematic for Mr Putin.
This appears to be a reality that the Kremlin is well aware of, despite criticisms that Mr Trump is reluctant to put real pressure on Mr Putin.
It might explain the continuing engagement in talks with Trump envoy Steve Witkoff, who has now held several rounds of discussions with high-level Russian officials, including with Mr Putin himself as recently as Apr 11 in St Petersburg. His next visit to Moscow will happen later this week, indicating that US shuttle diplomacy is continuing to hammer out the parameters of an acceptable deal.
ENOUGH TO SELL A POOR DEAL AS SUCCESS
While the continued use of the Witkoff-Putin channel is not evidence of a Russian commitment to ending the war, it does signal that Mr Putin is unwilling to walk away from negotiations at this time.
The Witkoff-Putin channel has enabled Russia to appear to remain constructively engaged in the search for a settlement of the war against Ukraine while simultaneously avoiding any concrete commitments.
On the contrary, Moscow has managed to shape much of the US narrative in its favour. The latest US ceasefire proposal, crossing several European and Ukrainian red lines, reflects the success of this strategy.
The bottom line in all of this is that a win-win outcome is impossible to achieve for Washington, Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels.
However, if there is a deal, each side will find enough in it to sell it as a success – even if it falls short of their preferred outcomes.
A time-limited, shaky ceasefire with vague commitments to an outline of a future peace agreement might fit this bill. It may bring a temporary pause in the fighting but will still fall well short of the actual end of the war.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.
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