Who is making decisions in Iran?
The question hanging over Tehran since the opening strikes of Iran's current war with the US and Israel is simple: Who is in charge?
Formally, the answer is clear. Mojtaba Khamenei has assumed the role of supreme leader following the killing of his father, Ali Khamenei, on the first day of the war on 28 February. In the Islamic Republic's system, that position is meant to be decisive. The leader has the final word on almost anything important: war, peace, and the state's strategic direction.
But in practice, the picture is far murkier.
Donald Trump has described Iran's leadership as "fractured" and suggested the US is waiting for Tehran to produce a "unified proposal".
Unity was certainly on the minds of Iran's leaders when they distributed a message to Iranians on their mobile phones on Thursday night saying there was "no such thing as a hardliner or moderate in Iran - there was just one nation, one course".
Invisible leader
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since taking power. Beyond a handful of written statements, including one insisting the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, there is little direct evidence of his day-to-day control.
Iranian officials have acknowledged that he was injured in the initial strikes but have offered few details. The New York Times, citing Iranian sources, reported this week that he may have suffered several injuries, including to his face that have made it difficult for him to speak.
That absence matters. In Iran's political system, authority is not just institutional - it is also performative. Khamenei's late father signalled intent through speeches, calibrated appearances, and visible arbitration between factions. That signalling function is now largely missing.
The result is a vacuum of interpretation. Some argue that Mojtaba Khamenei's wartime elevation has simply not allowed him to establish authority on his own terms. Others point to reports about his injuries and question whether he is able to actively manage the system at all.
Either way, decision-making appears less centralised than before the war.
Diplomatic channels open but only just
On paper, diplomacy sits with the government. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi continues to represent Tehran in talks with the US, under Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
But neither appears to be setting strategy and their authority is further put into question by the fact that Iran's delegation is headed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.
Araghchi's role looks operational rather than directive. His brief reversal over whether Hormuz was open or closed - first suggesting traffic had resumed and then quickly retracting that - offered a rare glimpse of how little control the diplomatic track has over military decisions.
Pezeshkian, meanwhile, has aligned himself with the broader direction of the regime without visibly shaping it. Considered a relatively moderate figure, he has so far avoided pushing an independent line.
The stalled second round of talks with the US in Islamabad reinforces the point. Even when diplomatic channels are open, the system appears unable or unwilling to commit.
A military expanding remit
Control over the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's most immediate source of leverage. But decisions over its closure sit with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by Ahmad Vahidi, rather than the diplomatic team.
That places real power in the hands of actors who operate behind closed doors. Unlike previous crises, there is no single, identifiable figure clearly owning the strategy. Instead, a pattern emerges: actions first, messaging later, and not always consistent.
In practice, it is the IRGC's actions, whether in enforcing the closure of Hormuz or in striking targets across the Gulf, that appear to be setting the pace of the crisis. Political and diplomatic responses often follow rather than lead.
This does not necessarily signal a breakdown of the administrative branches. But it does suggest that operational autonomy of the IRGC has widened, at least temporarily, in the absence of clear political arbitration.
Ghalibaf steps forward
Into this ambiguity steps Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.
A former Revolutionary Guard commander now serving as speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf has emerged as one of the most visible figures in the current moment. He has inserted himself into negotiations, addressed the public, and at times framed the war in pragmatic rather than ideological terms.
Within parliament and across conservative networks, resistance to negotiations remains strong.
Hardline messaging has intensified, with state media and public campaigns increasingly framing negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of the country's enemies.
Ghalibaf's position is therefore precarious - active but not clearly authorised. He insists his actions align with Mojtaba Khamenei's wishes, yet there is little visible evidence of direct co-ordination.
In a system that depends on signals from the top, that ambiguity is telling.
Claimed or exercised coherence
Taken together, these dynamics point to a system that is functioning, but not coherently directed.
The supreme leader's authority exists but is not visibly exercised. The presidency is aligned but not leading. Diplomacy is active, but not decisive. The military holds key levers, but without a clear public architect. Political figures are stepping forward, but without uncontested legitimacy.
This is not collapse. The Islamic Republic remains intact. But it does suggest something more subtle - a system struggling to convert the leverage it has - for instance the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz - into clear strategy at a moment of acute pressure. It can still act across multiple fronts, but it struggles to signal clear direction to its own centres of power.
And in Iran's political model, signalling is how coherence is maintained.
For now, the system is holding the line, maintaining control and avoiding any visible breakdown despite mounting pressure. But increasingly, it raises the question of whether coherence is being exercised or simply claimed.